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Terrorism
Terrorist Organisations Terrorist organisations generally fall into one of these main groups:
Terrorists' objectives Terrorism is not random, thoughtless violence. Quite the opposite, in fact: the terrorist carefully plans and orchestrates his campaign to achieve specific objectives. Just as a public relations 'spin doctor' will time a press event to gain the best media coverage, so a terrorist bomb may be timed to catch the Sunday papers or the evening news. Bruce
Hoffman, in his excellent book 'Inside Terrorism', explains that a typical
terrorist campaign moves through different phases as the group and its
motives gain wider recognition:
It is interesting to compare the IRA's campaign in Northern Ireland with the process outlined above. Terrorist tactics Early in the process, it is very much in the terrorists' interest to stage sensational acts of violence. The bigger the bomb, and the more innocent victims killed and injured, the greater the media impact. The terrorist always has the upper hand over the security forces. The terrorist decides where and when he will strike, while the security forces must constantly be on the alert. As more than one terrorist group has said: "We only have to be lucky once; you have to be lucky all the time". Intelligence is the most powerful weapon available to the security forces. Physical security measures - checkpoints, patrols, internment, etc - are of limited use, and may even encourage the population to support the terrorists. As it gains respectability and influence, a terrorist group typically renounces violence somewhere between steps 3 and 5 - at this stage bombings and shootings would be counter-productive. As with the IRA, however, this is the point where hardliners may break away and form splinter groups that refuse to 'negotiate with the enemy' and wish to continue the campaign of violence. If the original terrorist group is to form a credible government, they find themselves in the ironic position of having to deal with their former colleagues' terrorism. Does terrorism work? Governments like to argue that terrorism doesn't work. This is clearly untrue. History shows that a number of groups have used terrorism to gain power, generally following the process outlined above. Classic examples are the FLN in Algeria, who succeeded in gaining independence for Algeria from France; the Greek Cypriot group EOKA; the Palestine Liberation Organisation; and more recently the IRA. Even pressure groups such as the Animal Liberation Front have achieved the first few steps in the process, currently hovering between steps 3 and 4 above. Current
terrorist threats The nature of terrorist threats has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. Most obviously, the West no longer has to fear terrorist attacks from Soviet-sponsored groups. But every silver lining has a cloud. With the collapse of the old Soviet regime their arsenal of nuclear and other Weapons of Mass Destruction was broken up and is steadily appearing on the black market. Both the weapons themselves, and the scientists with the knowledge of how to make them, are available to the highest bidder. For a long time terrorists had drawn the line at using nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Then in 1995 the Aum Shinrikyo sect released nerve gas into the crowded subway system in Tokyo. Now the threshold has been crossed, the only way for a terrorist group to gain the maximum media coverage is to raise the stakes one step further. The Aum sect is just one example of a type of terrorism that will continue to be a serious problem from time to time, especially around dates with some special religious significance: apocalyptic religious groups convinced that the world is about to end, and determined to go out with a bang - earning themselves a special place in the afterlife. Another type of religious-inspired terrorism which presents a serious ongoing threat is, of course, Islamic extremism. With dozens of Islamic terrorist groups around the world, pursuing various agendas but sharing a rabid hatred of the United States and her allies, the possibility of an attack can never be ruled out. Islamic extremism is one area where the old problem of state-sponsored terrorism is still prevalent. Countries like Libya, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, North Korea, Cuba, Sudan and Syria all stand accused of supporting or harbouring terrorists. The bombings of US embassies in Africa in August 98 gave the US a golden opportunity to strike back against these supporters of terrorism - although at the cost of stirring up greater resentment and encouraging further escalation. One area that is in decline is that of nationalist/separatist groups, although specific areas still pose a threat. The IRA, for instance, is now committed to the peace process - yet a few hardliners, under the banner of 'Real IRA' refuse to compromise and are determined to continue with violent methods. The overall picture is that threats are constantly changing, but there is no prospect of terrorism becoming extinct in the forseeable future. |
Subject: Al Qaeda Training Video
Analysis ![]() ANALYSIS:Recently had the opportunity to conduct a detailed review of a captured Al Qaeda training tape.The tape was apparently produced for Al Qaeda internal use and did not appear to be an external propaganda production.The tape showed Al Qaeda operatives engaging in a number of training exercises including small arms firing ranges, live-fire room entry, and numerous mixed live-fire/role-player type of scenarios.Scenarios included: Assassinations, Kidnappings, Bombings, and Smallunit raids on various types of targets. The training depicted in these scenarios was clearly for export according to an intelligence expert that commented on the tape. "None of these training scenarios depicts the type of fighting that Al Qaeda engages in within Afghanistan."Detailed planning, diagraming and walk-through's followed by live-fire exercises were the norm.There were a lot of role playing, scenario type of interactions.The role players made aggressive moves simulating resistance at various points throughout the scenarios. All such resistance was met with immediate and brutal countermeasures by the terrorists. There was no presumed compliance on the part of the terrorists.The effort to produce detail and realism in training was impressive.These people are using extremely effective training methods!The following points were seen REPEATEDLY and ROUTINELY throughout the training exercises: 1. Use of standard
military small unit tactics with multiple elements.(Assault, Security and
Support elements) Specific scenarios
included: MULTIPLE
SCENARIOS/EXERCISES involved raids on buildings with a largenumber of
occupants (school or office building?)These raids followed a standard
pattern: |
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World
War IV Restoration Weekend
Introduction: The Honorable Bob Barr It’s an honor to be here. Thank you, David, for the work that you do.
It’s wonderful to be here, and to have an opportunity to see and to
introduce an old colleague of mine. Not that he’s any older than I am,
we just happen to have somewhat of a similar background. Some of you may think that I have always been in politics, but I
haven’t. There was a time in the distant past, in a land far, far ago,
where I actually worked as a professional. Came to a job every day. Was
held to certain standards, where I had actual job evaluations and had to
get raises and so forth, and I actually enjoyed it. It was at the CIA. I
spent close to eight years at the Agency back in the 1970’s. Having the
opportunity this weekend to visit with Jim Woolsey and have the honor of
introducing him here today really is wonderful. Something else that I thought of and this wasn’t really in
anticipation of introducing Jim this morning, it just so happened that
when I went up to our room last night, my wife was flipping through the
channels and she came across something that I had never seen which was the
Ozbournes. And it was, I mean, it was the most bizarre thing I’ve ever
seen. It was Christmas with the Ozbournes. And, you know, they do
celebrate Christmas apparently. Of course, in the same bizarre way they
celebrate everything else. It was fascinating to watch it because aside from the language they use
it reminds you of the government. Everbody’s running off in all these
directions and nobody’s really paying attention to what’s going on.
Even over Christmas dinner. It was fascinating to watch. It frequently seems to be that way in government. There are so many
different interest groups. There are so many individuals with particular
constituencies and particular needs and particular backgrounds that it
does sometimes appear as if nobody’s really paying attention to the
little pieces, the details, the organization which is absolutely essential
if anything constructive is going to get done other than just by chance. But, the one person in Washington, particularly in the arena of
national defense policy and international policy, i.e. foreign policy, who
is tasked with that, is our guest speaker this morning. And he does a
magnificent job of it. The interesting thing, if you’ll look at Jim Woolsey’s bio, is how
different it is from the bios of professionals in other walks of life. If
you look at J.D. Hayworth’s bio, or Senator Bunning’s or mine, every
other word is our name. You know, we want people to know what great things
we’ve done and all the awards we’ve received and the positions we’ve
held. By contrast, you have to read Jim Woolsey’s bio very carefully
even to realize that he did serve in one of the most important jobs in our
government, and that is as DCI, Director of Central Intelligence. It’s
not something that he has to highlight, that he has to place and underline
and embolden in his resume. The man’s background, the man’s reputation, the man’s credibility
speak for themselves. If you look at his bio, his background in arms
control and military affairs and disarmament talks, and the aerospace
industry and academia -- it actually is this – the areas of expertise
and the ability to master tremendously complex technical issues in a way
that makes sense to other people that really are the reasons he was chosen
as DCI. These are the things that make up a good DCI. An ability to master
technical aspects of things that are going on in the world, an ability to
assemble on the table a very large number of components and make sure that
they get put together properly. It’s not the DCI’s job to make the
decisions. The DCI’s job is to make sure that the decisions that are
made by our top level policy leaders -- including most importantly, the
President of the United States -- are made based on the very best
intelligence at that particular moment in time. And that is not an easy job, because of all these competing interests.
It’s particularly important and I think particularly timely, that we
hear from Jim this morning because so many things are currently going on
in the world our success is going to be predicated on one thing as much as
anything else, and that is good intelligence. The one thing you never want
to do is to operate based on bad intelligence. But, the one thing even
more than that that you never want to do, is do something based on bad
intelligence. So maintaining that proper balance between secrecy and confidentiality,
yet having sufficient openness so that there is discourse and so that the
President and his top folks have access to that information in their
decision-making is extremely important. Jim, it’s an honor to have you here. We appreciate your sharing your
time, your expertise, your background, and your resources with us. Please
join me in welcoming one of America’s great distinguished scholars,
business leaders, and
I was really quite honored when David asked me a few months ago to be
with you this weekend. But, to tell you the truth, in the 34 years I’ve
been in Washington until I went straight this last summer and joined Booz
Allen Hamilton as a vice president, I spent the bulk of that time, 22
years, as: A. a lawyer; and B. in Washington D.C.; and, then, I C.
spent some time out at the CIA in D. the Clinton Administration. So I’m
actually pretty well honored to be invited into any polite company for any
purposes whatsoever. I have adopted Eliot Cohen’s formulation, distinguished professor at
Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies, that we are in
World War IV, World War III having been the Cold War. And I think
Eliot’s formulation fits the circumstances really better than describing
this as a war on terrorism. Let me say a few words about who our enemy is in this World War IV, why
they’re at war with us and (now) we with them, and how we have to think
about fighting it both at home and abroad. First of all, who are they? Well, there are at least three, but I would
say principally three movements, of a sort, all coming out of the Middle
East. And the interesting thing is that they’ve been at war with us for
years. The Islamist Shia, the ruling circles, the ruling Clerics, the
Mullahs of Iran, minority -- definite minority of the Iranian Shiite
Clerics, but those who constitute the ruling force in Iran and sponsor and
back Hezbollah, have been at war with us for nearly a quarter of a
century. They seized our hostages in 1979 in Tehran. They blew up our
embassy and our marine barracks in Beirut in The second group is the fascists and I don’t use that as an expletive
-- the Baathist parties of Iraq and really Syria as well, are essentially
fascist parties or modeled after the fascist parties of the ’30s.
They’re totalitarian, they’re anti-Semitic, they’re fascist. The Baathists in Iraq have been at war with us for over a decade. For
Saddam, the Gulf War never stopped. He says it never stopped. He behaves
as if it never stopped. He tried to assassinate former President Bush in
1993 in Kuwait. He has various ties, not amounting to direction and
control, but various associations with different terrorist groups over the
years, including al-Qaeda. He shoots at our aircraft, again yesterday,
over the no-fly zones. He’s still at war. He signed a cease fire, which
he’s not observing, and so it’s even clearer that he is at war. And he
has been so for at least 11 years. The third group, and the one that
caused us finally to notice, is the Islamist Sunni. And this is the most,
in some ways, I think virulent and long-term portion of these three
groupings that are at war with us, and will be at war, I think, for a long
time. The Wahhabi movement, the religious movement in Saudi Arabia dating
back to the 18th century and with roots even well before that, was joined
in the ’50s and ’60s by immigration into Saudi Arabia by Islamists, or
a more modern strife of essentially the same ideology, many of them coming
from Egypt. And the very fundamentalist -- Islamist I think is the best
formulation -- groups of this sort, more or less focused on what they call
the near enemy. Say the barbaric regime in Egypt, and to some extent, the
Saudi royal family -- the attacks in 1979 on the great mosques in Mecca.
They were focusing on what they called the “near enemy” until sometime
in the mid 1990’s. Around 1994, they decided to turn and focus their
concentration and effort on what they call the Crusaders and Jews, mainly
us. And they have been at war with us since at least about 1994, give or
take a year or so, in number of well-noted terrorists incidents, including
the Cole and the cast African embassy bombings and, of course, September
11th. What is different after September 11th is not that these three groups
came to be at war with us. They’ve been at war with us for some time.
It’s that we finally, finally may have noticed and have decided at
least, in part, that we are at war with them. If these are the three
groupings -- and by the way, I think of these more or less as analogous to
three mafia families. They do hate each other and they do kill each other
from time to time. But, they hate us a great deal more and they’re
perfectly willing and perfectly capable to assist one another in one way
or another, including Iraq and al-Qaeda. If that’s whom we’re at war with, why? Why did they decide to come
after us? I think there are two basic reasons. The first, and the
underlying one, was best expressed to me last January by a D.C. cab
driver. Now, I resolutely refuse --- since I’m not ever in elective
politics, I can afford to do this -- I refuse to read any articles about
public opinion polls. And And I got into a cab last January, the day after former President
Clinton gave a speech at Georgetown University, in which he implied -- he
didn’t exactly say, but pretty well implied -- that the reason we were
attacked on September 11th, was because America’s conduct of slavery and
the treatment of the American Indian historically. And as I got into the
cab, I saw that the cab driver was one of my favorite varieties of D.C.
cab drivers, an older, Black American long-term resident of D.C., a guy
about my age. And the Washington Times article was open in the front seat
to that story of the President’s speech. So as I got in, I said to the cab driver, “I see your paper in the
front there. Did you read that piece about President Clinton’s speech
yesterday?” He said, “Oh, yeah.” I said, “What did you think
about it?” He said, “These people don’t hate us for what we’ve
done wrong. They hate us for what we do right.” You can’t do better than that. We’re hated because of freedom of
speech, because of freedom of religion, because of our economic freedom,
because of our equal -- or at least almost equal treatment of women --
because of all the good things My friend, Tom Moore, a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and maybe
known to some of you here, was a young officer at the end of World War II
and participated in the interrogations of Prince Konoe and several of the
Japanese leaders of the handful who were eventually hanged. And the team
he was with asked all of them, “Why did you do it. Why did you attack us
at Pearl Harbor?” He said, they all said pretty much the same thing.
They said, “We looked at what you were doing in the ’20s and ’30s.
You were disarming. You wouldn’t fortify Wake Island. You wouldn’t
fortify Guam. Your army had to drill with wooden rifles [because of the
opposition to rearmament—ED]. We had no idea that this rich spoiled,
feckless country would do what you did after December 7 of 1941. You
stunned us.” Flash forward three quarters of a century. I think we gave a lot of
evidence to Saddam and to the Islamist Shia in Tehran and Hezbollah and to
the Islamist Sunni that we were for a long time, essentially, a rich,
spoiled feckless country that wouldn’t fight. In 1979, they took our hostages and we tied yellow ribbons around trees
and launched an ineffective effort, crashing helicopters in the desert to
rescue them. In 1983, they blew up our embassy and our marine barracks in Beirut.
What did we do? We left. Throughout much of the 1980’s, various
terrorist acts were committed against us. We would occasionally arrest a
few small fry, with one honorable exception -- President Reagan’s strike
against Tripoli. But generally speaking, we litigated instead of doing
much else with the terrorist acts of the ’80s. In 1991, President Bush organized a magnificent coalition against the
seizure of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein. We fought the war superbly -- and
then stopped it while the Republican guard was intact. And after having
encouraged the Kurds and the Shiia to rebel against Saddam, we stood back,
left the bridges intact, left their units intact, let them fly helicopters
around carrying troops and missiles, and we watched the Kurds and Shiia
who were winning in 15 of Iraq’s 18 provinces, to be massacred. And the
world looked at us and said, well, we know what the Americans value. They
save their oil in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and after that, they didn’t
care. And then in 1993, Saddam tries to assassinate former President Bush in
Kuwait with a bomb, and President Clinton fires a couple of dozen cruise
missiles into an empty building in the middle of the night in Baghdad,
thereby retaliating quite effectively against Iraqi cleaning women and
night watchmen, but not especially effectively against Saddam Hussein. In 1993, our helicopters were shot down in Mogadishu and as in Beirut
in ten years earlier, we left. And throughout the rest of the ’90s, we continued our practice of the
’80s. Instead of sending military force, we usually sent prosecutors and
litigators. We litigate well in the United States. And we would
occasionally catch some small-fry terrorists in the United States or
elsewhere, and prosecute them. And once in a while, lob a few bombs or
cruise missiles from afar. And that was it until after September 11th. So I would suggest that our response after September 11th in
Afghanistan, like our response against the Japanese after If that’s why we’re at war, how must we fight it at home and
abroad? At home the war is going to be difficult in two ways. One is that
the infrastructure which serves this wonderful country is the most
technologically sophisticated infrastructure the world has ever seen. We
are a society of dozens -- hundreds of networks. Food processing and
delivery, the internet, financial transfers, oil and gas pipelines, on and
on and on. None of these was put together with a single thought being given to
being resilient against terrorism. All are open, relatively easy access.
Their vulnerable and dangerous points are highlighted. Transformer here,
hazardous chemicals here, cable crossing here because we need to do
maintenance. We haven’t had to worry about domestic violence against our
civilian infrastructure, with the exception of Sherman burning some
plantations on his march to the sea, since the British burned Washington
in 1814. So virtually all of our infrastructure has been put together with this
sense of openness and ease of access and resilience -- some resilience --
against random failures. But random failures is not what we saw September
11th and a year ago, and I’m afraid not what we will see in the future. About seven years ago, one of our communication satellites’ computer
chip failed. The satellite lost its altitude control and In the preparations for September 11th that were taking place sometime
in the late 1990’s or 2000, a group of very sharp and very evil men sat
down and said to themselves, something like this. Let’s see. The foolish
Americans when they do baggage searches at airports ignore short knives
like box cutters. And short knives can slit throats just as easily as long
knives. Second, if you can believe it, they conduct themselves with respect to
airplane hijackings as if all hijackings are going to go to Cuba and
they’re just going to have to sit on the ground for a few hours. So they
tell their air crews and everyone to be very polite to hijackers. This is
also good. And third, even though twice a year going back many years, there have
been crazy people who get into the cockpits of their civilian airliners
and people write in to the FAA and say, you ought to do something about
this, they continue to have flimsy cockpit doors on their airliners.
Let’s see. Short knives, polite to hijackers, friendly cockpit doors. We
can take over airliners, fly them into buildings, and kill thousands of
them. That is not a random failure. That is a planned use of part of our
infrastructure to kill Americans. It’s going for the jugular, going for
the weak point. Einstein used to say, “God may be sophisticated, but he’s not plain
mean.” And what I think Einstein meant by that is, since for him
nature and God were pretty much the same thing, if you’re playing
against nature and trying to say, discover a new principle of physics,
it’s a sophisticated problem. It’s going to be very tough. But
there’s nobody over there trying to outwit you and make it harder. In
war and terrorism, there is. There is someone who is trying to do that.
And we have not given a single thought to how to manage our infrastructure
for the possibility of an attack on our own soil, something we have not
had to deal with for 200 years -- since 1814 – when the British burned
the White House. Full hospitals. Great idea. Keep hospital costs down. Health care costs
down. Move people through hospitals rapidly. All hospitals 99 percent
occupancy, et cetera. Wonderful idea, until there’s a bioterrorist
attack and then thousands or hundreds or thousands or millions of
Americans need some sort of special healthcare. All of these networks have their weak points and many of them have
incentives in them to -- not for this purpose of course -- but essentially
to be vulnerable to terrorism. We are not only going to have to go through
our infrastructure -- and this is what I’m spending a lot of my time
working on now -- we are not only going to have to go through our
infrastructure and find the functional equivalent of the flimsy cockpit
doors and get them fixed. Then, we are also going to have to pull together
and take a look at things like our electricity grids, our oil and gas
pipelines, our container ports and the rest and figure out ways to change
the incentives so that they build in resilience and do it in such a way
that it’s compatible with economic freedom in a market economy. We
don’t want some bureaucrat up there ordering people to do this and this
and this. But, we have to get some resilience, some promotion of
resilience into the incentives -- tax or otherwise -- for the way our
infrastructure’s managed. That’s only one of the two hard jobs we’ve
got. The other one, in some ways may be even harder. We have to do two
things simultaneously here -- nobody told us it was going to be easy. We
have to fight successfully in the United States against terrorist cells
and organizations that support terrorism and we have to deal with the
extremely difficult fact that some of these are, at least, superficially
religiously rooted in one aspect anyway of Islam. We have to understand
that the vast majority of American Muslims are certainly not terrorists
and are not sympathetic to them. But that there are institutions and
individuals and there are institutions and individuals with a lot of money
that are effectively part of the infrastructure that encourages and
supports the hatred of the West of capitalism and of us that is manifested
in terrorism. We also have to remember who we are. We are creatures of Madison’s
Constitution and his Bill of Rights and we have to step by step,
intervention by intervention, remember both that we are Americans and
under a Constitution, and that we are at war and some part of that war is
here and now. Those are very hard choices. One by one. My personal judgment is that
none of the decisions so far made by the Administration goes beyond what
is a reasonable line of taking strong action domestically against
terrorism because the Supreme Court has historically been extremely
tolerant of the Executive, but especially Executive and Congress moving
together in times of crisis and war. In the Civil War, Lincoln suspended habeas corpus even. In World War
II, of course, we had the Japanese-Americans even put in the relocation
camps in the western part of the country. In World War I, there was some very draconian legislation also upheld
by the Supreme Court. And nothing that has been done so far by the
Administration, of course, even remotely approaches any of those. But we
do have to be alert. We do not want in the mid-21st century people looking
back on us having made some of the kinds of decisions that, for example,
were made to incarcerate the Nisei, the Japanese-Americans in World War II
and saying, how in the world could those people have done that? But this country can do some ugly things when it gets scared. And one
thing to remember about the incarceration of the Japanese-Americans in
World War II is that the three individuals most responsible were Franklin
Delano Roosevelt, the What we have to do is manage this domestic war in such a way as to move
decisively and effectively against terrorist cells Let me conclude by saying a few words about how I think we have to
fight this abroad. These three movements, I think, require somewhat different tactics. In
some ways, the most interesting situation right now exists with the
Islamist Shia, the ruling circles of Iran. Because the small minority of
Iranian Shiite mullahs who constitute the ruling circles of Iran, are
effectively in the same position that the inhabitants of the Kremlin were
in 1988 or the inhabitants of Versailles in 1788, mainly the storm isn’t
quite overhead yet, but if they look at the horizon, they can see it
gathering. They have lost the students. They have lost the women. They have lost
the brave newspaper editors and professors who are in prison, some under
sentence of death and being tortured. They are one by one losing the grand
Ayatollahs. Ayatollah Montazeri, a very brave man, issuing fatwas against
suicide killings has been under house arrest for five years. Early this
past summer, Ayatollah Taheri, who was a very, very hard line supporter of
the mullahs in the City of Esfahan, issued a blast against them saying
that what they were doing, supporting tortures, supporting terrorism, was
fundamentally at odds with the tenants of Islam, more student
demonstrations and indeed, the Iranians are having enough trouble keeping
the students down using Iranian muscle, using thugs, they are starting to
have to begin to import Syrians, who don’t speak Farsi, in order to be
able to suppress their student demonstrations. Keep your eye on Tehran. I can’t claim that it’s going to change
soon. The mullahs have a great deal of power. They have oil money and the
military force and the rest. But, there are, I think, some tectonic shifts
below the surface there. With respect to our own conduct, I think the
President did exactly the right thing in the early part of the summer,
when after the student demonstration surrounding Taheri’s blast, he
issued a statement basically saying that the United States was on the side
of the students not the mullahs. And it drove the mullahs absolutely crazy
and I think that’s evidence of the shrewdness of the President’s move.
The fascists, the Baathists in Iraq are, of course, at the front of
everybody’s concern. I think that it is good that we were Hans Blix, to put it as gently as a I can, does not have a stellar
background of inquisitiveness or decisiveness. When in But, if he does, the President under this resolution will have some
tough choices to make and perhaps, as soon as December 8, as to whether
the United States will on its own, declare what will certainly be a lie:
Saddam’s declaration that he has no weapons of mass destruction
programs. Whether the United States will decide that that is a violation
of the U.N. resolution and we will then take action. I must admit, I hope
that happens because I don’t believe there is any way to solve this
problem of Iraq without removing Saddam forcefully. I wish it were
otherwise, but I see no way around it. As time goes on, if this winter passes -- and winter is when you want
to fight in this region because our troops will have to wear heavy
protective gear against chemical weapons -- if this winter passes it will
be another year before we can move again and he will then be even closer
to having nuclear weapons and will have even more sophisticated delivery
means for the chemical and bacteriological weapons than he already has. It
is a shame. It is unfortunate. But, it is the dilemma that is presented to
us and particularly, to the President, here beginning around December 8.
And I believe that he deserves, whatever he decides, all the support any
of us can give him. The third group, the Islamist Sunni, are al-Qaeda, are in many ways,
going to be the hardest to deal with because they are fueled by oil money
from the Gulf, Saudi Arabia principally. They are wealthy in and of
themselves. They’re present in some 60 countries and they are
fanatically like the Wahhabis, who are their first cousins. They are
fanatically anti-Western, anti-modern, anti-Christian, anti-Jewish. If you want to get a feel for the infrastructure, the intellectual
infrastructure -- if you can call it that of their thinking -- there are
websites where one can go to pull in what the sermons are on any given
Friday throughout Saudi Arabia. I looked at one such set of sermons two or
three weeks ago before some discussions we were having the defense policy
board. And the three main themes that week were that all Jews are pigs and
monkeys. The second major theme was that all Christians and Jews are the
enemy and it is our obligation to hate them and destroy them. And the
third was that women in the United States routinely commit incest with
their fathers and brothers and it is a common and accepted thing in the
United States. This is not extraordinary. This is the routine Wahhabi view. One
Wahhabi cleric was interviewed by a Washington Post reporter a few weeks
ago in Saudi Arabia. The Post reporter asked him, “Tell me. I’m a
Christian. Do you hate me?” And the Wahhabi Cleric said, “Well,
of course, if you’re a Christian, I hate you. But, I’m not going to
kill you.” This is the moderate view. And we need to realize that
just as angry German nationalism of the 1920’s and 1930’s was the soil
in which Nazism grew, not all German nationalists became Nazis, but that
was the soil in which it grew. So the angry form of Islamism and Wahhabism
in Saudi Arabia today is the soil in which anti-Western and anti-American
terrorism grows. This is going to be a long war, very long indeed. I hope not as long as
the Cold War, 40 plus years, but certainly longer than either World War I
or World War II. I rather imagine it’s going to be measured, I’m
afraid, in decades. Is there any answer? Is there any potential end to this? Now, what
I’m about to say is going to sound rather idealistic, but I think it’s
the only thing that we can do. If you look at the world 85 years ago in the spring of 1917, when this
country entered World War I, there were about 10 or 12 democracies in the
world. The United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Britain, France,
Switzerland, a couple of countries in Northern Europe. It was a world of
empires, of kingdoms, of colonies, and of various types of authoritarian
regimes through the world. Today, Freedom House, which I think does the
best work on this sort of thing, says that there are 120 out of 192
countries in the world that are democracies. The world is about evenly
divided between what Freedom House calls free, such as the United States;
and what it calls partly free, such as Russia. But there are still 120 countries with some parliamentary contested
elections and some beginnings, at least, of the rule of law. That is an
amazing change in the lifetime of many individuals now living -- from a 10
or 12 to 120 democracies in the world. Nothing like that has ever happened
in world history. Needless to say, we have had something to do with this, both in winning
World War I -- helping win World War I -- in prevailing, along with
Britain, in World War II; and eventually, in prevailing in the Cold War.
And along the way, a lot of people said very cynically at different times
-- fill in the blanks -- The Germans will never be able to run a
democracy; the Japanese will never be able to run a democracy; the
Russians will never be able to run a democracy; nobody with a Chinese
Confucian background is going to be able to run a democracy. It took some
help, but the Germans and the Japanese and now, even the Russians, and
Taiwanese seem to have figured it out. In spite of vast cultural
differences, very different from the Anglo Saxon world of parliament that
Westminister and the early United States a lot of people seemed to have
figured it out. In the Muslim world, outside the 22 Arab states, which have no
democracies, some reasonably well-governed states that are moderating and
changing, such as Bahrein extent and others. Of the 24 Muslim-predominant
non-Arab states, about half are democracies. They include some of the
poorest countries in the world. Bangladesh, Mali – Mali is almost an
ideal democracy. Nearly 200 million Muslims live in a democracy in India.
Outside one province, they are generally at peace with their Hindu
neighbors. There is a special problem in the Middle East for historical
and cultural reasons. Outside of Israel and Turkey, the Middle East
essentially consists of no democracies. It has, rather, two types of
governments -- pathological predators and vulnerable autocrats. This is
not a good mix. Five of those states: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Sudan and
Libya sponsor and assist terrorism in one way or another; all five of
those are working on weapons of mass destruction of one type or another.
The Mideast presents a serious and massive problem of pathological
predators next to vulnerable autocracies. I don’t believe this terror war is ever really going to go away until
we change the face of the Middle East. Now, that is a tall order. But,
it’s not as tall an order as what we have already done. In 1917, Europe
was largely monarchies, empires, and autocracies. Today, outside Belarus
and Ukraine, it is largely democratic, even including Russia. These changes that have taken place over the course of the last 85
years are a remarkable achievement. The ones that still have to be
undertaken in a part of the world that has historically not had democracy,
which has reacted angrily against intrusions from the outside,
particularly the Arab Middle East, presents a huge challenge. But, I would say this. Both to the terrorists and to the pathological
predators such as Saddam Hussein and to the autocrats as well, the
barbarics, the Saudi royal family. They have to realize that now for the
fourth time in 100 years, we’ve been awakened and this country is on the
march. We didn’t choose this fight, but we’re in it. And being on the
march, there’s only one way we’re going to be able to win it. It’s
the way we won World War I fighting for Wilson’s 14 points. The way we
won World War II fighting for Churchill’s and Roosevelt’s Atlantic
Charter and the way we won World War III fighting for the noble ideas I
think best expressed by President Reagan, but also very importantly at the
beginning by President Truman, that this was not a war of us against them.
It was not a war of countries. It was a war of freedom against tyranny. We
have to convince the people of the Middle East that we are on their side,
as we convinced Lech Walesa and Vaclav Havel and Andrei Sakharov that we
were on their side. This will take time. It will be difficult. But I think we need to say
to both the terrorists and the dictators and also to the autocrats who
from time to time are friendly with us, that we know, we understand we are
going to make you nervous. We want you to be nervous. We want you to realize now for the fourth
time in 100 years, this country is on the march and we are on the side of
those whom you most fear, your own people.
James Woolsey: I’d kind of put the CIA in the pre-September
11th world at maybe a grade B and the FBI at kind of a B- and the rest of
the country flunking. They didn’t do everything they should do. A
culture built up over the years best described, I think, in Bob Baer’s
book, See No Evil, of sort of political correctness at the agency in which
it was hard to get risk-taking behavior by case officers, which as Bob
points out is essential. Some of that political correctness was self-imposed, but a lot of it
was imposed by law or regulation. My successor adopted some guidelines
under pressure from then Congressman Torricelli, happily no longer with
us, that would have -- it did discourage necessary security policies. They
didn’t bar, but they discouraged the CIA from recruiting asset sources,
spies, if those spies might have had some violence in their background.
Hello. There’s nobody in terrorist groups except terrorists. That would
be like telling the FBI to please penetrate the Mafia, but don’t put any
actual crooks on your payroll as informants. Some of what the CIA didn’t know was, however, imposed by law. For
example, until the U.S.A. Patriot Act was passed, it was illegal for the
FBI to obtain information about terrorism in a domestic investigation
pursuant to Grand Jury subpoena. It was illegal for them to share that
with the intelligence community. So some of the connections, for example,
with Iraq and by at least one, and maybe two, of the World Trade Center
bombers in 1993, were, you know, sealed up in the courthouse basement
until after the trial three years later. So there were a number of things that kept the agency from doing as
much as it should, and some of it was self-imposed. But, I’d have to say
that they did at least start focusing very hard on bin Laden by around
’97, ’98. They had a special unit focused on it. They got extra money
for terrorism in 1999 because counter terrorism -- because people were
worried about the millennium celebrations and terrorism. The morning after
the millennium was over, more or less peacefully, the money was taken away
by the Office of Management of the Budget and by the Congress and it went
back down to a lower level of spending. I think there are some special problems at the FBI because it was a
very decentralized organization. So if you had a smart agent in
Minneapolis worried about Moussaoui and a smart agent in Phoenix worried
about training in flight schools, they were never able to contact one
another and they didn’t know one another existed. So neither the Agency nor the Bureau covered itself with glory before
9/11, even though both were responsible for rolling back and stopping a
number of terrorist attacks. But, the real problem was that the country was at a beach party, just
as we were in the 1920’s. We thought we’d won the war to make the
world safe for democracy so, hey, Henry Stimson, Secretary of State,
wonderful man, says gentlemen don’t read one another’s mail and closes
down the code breaking in the State Department in 1929. Same kind of phenomenon in the 1990’s. Everybody thought “the Cold
War’s over.” Hey, we can relax. The professionals, some of them, were
doing a decent job working hard at it. Most of the rest of the country was
taking it easy. Question 2: Jim, you adverted to the possibilities of regime
change in Iran. The President has talked a lot about regime change in
Iraq. What do you think the possibilities for and the desirability of
regime change in the area currently known as Saudi Arabia? James Woolsey: Well, I think American opinion shifted decisively
from moderately positive to rather negative about Saudi Arabia when it
became clear that 15 of the 19 people who undertook the hijackings of
September 11th were Saudi. Indeed, it suggests a wry quip about the
suggestion of Sean Wilentz, a professor at Princeton, that it’s
important to understand the root causes of terrorism. If you look at who
attacked us September 11th, you’d have to say the root causes of
terrorism were wealth, status, and education. There is a special problem in Saudi Arabia because after 1979 when the
ruling royal family got very frightened, both because of Khomeini in
Tehran and because of the siege and the assault on the great mosque in
Mecca by the Islamists, and the fact that the king was nearly
assassinated. It was a very, very shocking sequence for the royal family.
Although, they have from time to time kept the Wahhabis somewhat in check,
by ’79, they were scared enough that I think they more or less made a
pact with their Wahhabi sect to `give them all the money they could ever
want to go set up in Pakistan and print text books saying Christians and
Jews were the enemy for Indonesian schools and so on if the Wahhabis and
Islamists would just leave them alone. And I think that the problem is that we don’t yet have a Saudi ruler
with the backbone to reverse that course. Now, it’s not impossible that
it will be reversed. But, I haven’t seen it yet. And I think that it
does present an extremely serious problem. I don’t think it’s in our interests to see in the near term a
regime change in Saudi Arabia. But, I do think it is very much in our
interest not to need them. I think the only way that we are going to get
any kind of help at all from them in a Gulf War again, a war in Iraq, even
permission to use their airspace, is if they’re absolutely certain we do
not need them. The last way to get their support is to go to them hat in hand and say, please help us. A lot of this has to do with the power of oil. I had a piece in Commentary magazine in September called “Destroying the Oil Weapon.” It’s too long to go into here, but I commend it to any of you who might be interested. We have a serious problem with Saudi Arabia. But, first things first. And I think the most dangerous regime in the Mideast is clearly Iraq, with Iran, close behind. But for the reasons I said I think Iran is not likely or not wise to be a target of American military force. In Iraq, I think that’s the only thing we can do.
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Designed by
Johnny
Salaza,
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